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Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been increas-
ingly utilized in various civilian and military applications such
as remote sensing, border patrolling, disaster monitoring, and
communication coverage extension. However, there are still prone
to several cyber attacks such as GPS spoofing attacks, distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks
to obtain their collected information or to enforce the UAVs to
perform their requested actions which may damage the UAVs
or their surrounding environment or even endanger the safety
of human in the operation field. In this paper, we propose a
trust monitoring mechanism in which a centralized unit (e.g. the
ground station) regularly observe the behavior of the UAVs in
terms of their motion path, their consumed energy, as well as
the number of their completed tasks and measure a relative
trust score for the UAVs to detect any abnormal behaviors
in a real-time manner. Our simulation results show that the
trust model can detect malicious UAVs, which can be under
various cyber-security attacks such as flooding attacks, man-in-
the-middle attacks, GPS spoofing attack in real-time.
Index Terms—Trust monitoring, UAV networks, cyber attacks,
selfish behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) recently play a major role
in several civilian and military operations including remote
sensing, surveillance, package delivery, and medical services
[1]–[6]. Their unique features including high-mobility, ease of
deployment, and their ability to hover enable them to provide
services in hard-to-reach regions or time-critical missions
during man-made and natural disasters in order to provide
urgent Internet and communication services when necessary
or for imaging purposes [7], [8].
Despite this wide range of often critical UAV missions, the
UAV networks are still vulnerable to several attacks including
cyber-attacks such as false data injection [9], physical attacks
such as targeting the UAVs using firearms [10], and cyber-
physical attacks such as GPS spoofing [11]. Therefore, an
important step toward safe applications of UAVs networks
is developing robust trust monitoring mechanisms to identify
potential attacks on these systems during the flight.
There are several existing trust management mechanisms
as further discussed in Section II to detect the malicious
UAVs. However, the majority of these methods either focus
on a specific type of aircraft, or an specific type of cyber-
security attacks. Another challenge with several current pro-
posed methods is that they are not able detect the attacks in
real-time, since they often look at the history of the UAVs’
trust to evaluate if they have deviated from normal behavior
long enough to impact their reputation [12]. It means that if
the UAVs with a good reputation are targeted by an attacker,
the attack may not be detected immediately. The reputation-
based methods also involve storing the reputations of all agents
over the course of time at the central unit, which require a
large memory space. Another trend in trust monitoring is the
class of cooperative trust monitoring methods, where all the
agents coordinate with one another to monitor the behavior of
their teammates. While such methods are robust against the
”single point of failure” problem, where the centralized trust
monitoring unit may be attacked, they involve large energy
consumption and computation load at the UAVs to observe
other agents’ behavior and also impose a heavy signaling load
to the system. Some other trust monitoring approaches [13]
were proposed based on observing the statistical measures to
detect malicious UAV in real-time, however, these methods
cannot distinguish between the malicious behavior or potential
change of behavior due to harsh environmental conditions.
In this paper, we propose a trust monitoring framework to
detect various attacks such as DDoS attack, GPS spoofing
attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and the agent’s potential
selfish act in a network of UAVs in a real-time manner. In
this method, the relative trust scores of all UAVs are regularly
measured at a central unit by observing several factors includ-
ing (i) the observation of the central unit from the environment
to estimate how successful a UAV has been in completing
its assigned tasks, (ii) the deviation of the UAVs from their
original path, and (iii) the energy consumption of the UAVs.
The UAVs under the DDoS and GPS spoofing attacks consume
more energy than normal UAV, and are more likely to deviate
from the predicted paths. Also, the UAVs under the man-in-
the-middle attack often complete a less number of assigned
tasks related to a normal condition. Therefore, the selected
factors to monitor the trust can capture various common at-
tacks. The trust score of each UAV will be evaluated compared
to the trust scores of its teammates to identify if a UAV has
been attacked. This method can be applied to any types of
aircraft, can detect the attacks in real-time instead of relying
on the history of the agents’ behavior and does not require
large memory or computation capabilities. Furthermore, the
proposed method can differentiate the malicious behavior from
the unstable behavior due to harsh environmental conditions.
II. RELATED WORKS
There are several methods to monitor the safety of differ-
ent aircraft such as the fault detection methods which can
detect any abnormalities in the aircraft. Qi et al. [14], [15]
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provides a comprehensive review of recent methods for fault
diagnosis. Birnbaum et al. [16] propose a method in which the
Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm is applied to perform
estimation and tracking of the controller parameters. In this
method, data in batches of size 500 samples are processed
and compared to detect discrepancies indicating anomalies.
Several anomaly detection methods are tailored to specific
types of attacks. [16] overviews of the most popular six types
of threats for UAVs, such as hardware failure, malicious hard-
ware, and control computer attacks. In order to detect some
types of hijacking or hardware failures, a Hardware Health
Monitor is utilized, which monitors all of the UAV sensor data.
This data consists of the positioning data and flight surfaces
monitored by using the RLS algorithm. Another common
attack in UAV networks is the GPS spoofing attack. In order
to detect this type of attack, [17] discussed a technique, in
which the receiver observes the received signal strength and
compares it to the predicted signal strength over time. [18]
proposed a method that uses two GPS receivers and check their
cross-correlations to detect GPS spoofing attacks. However,
this technique cannot detect the spoofing attack when the
signals are weak. In order to detect the GPS spoofing attacks
and determine the real locations of UAVs, [10] proposes a
framework, where the UAVs are allowed to travel on the
shortest path between any given two locations by using the
optimal UAVs controller. This model can capture the possible
GPS spoofer on the UAVs traveling path. This method enables
the UAVs to determine their real location under GPS spoofing
attack by using the neighbor UAVs real location and their
relevant distances.
[13] proposed a model-based trust monitoring approach
where several basic statistical measures are used to track the
characteristics of a flight. These statistical measures including
the mean, variance, and covariance across multiple flights at
different stages of the flight are stored as a fingerprint of the
flight, where the variations of the flight pattern can alarm that
the UAV was hijacked. A threshold is set to determine at what
point the flight is no longer normal. In this method, the normal
flight statistics are added to the baseline and any abnormal
ones are removed from the baseline. This method is tested by
using 20 potential hijacking simulations and 50 safe flights.
All of the obvious hijacking scenarios were detected correctly,
however some unstable flights that were close to the baseline
windy flights remained undetectable.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Here, we propose a centralized trust monitoring mechanism
to monitor the behavior of multiple UAVs during the flight
and detect any potential abnormal behaviors in real-time. Let
us consider a homogeneous network of N UAVs which fly
over a M ×M area, where M is a positive arbitrary integer.
M is chosen randomly from [1.5km, 2.5km] range. Each
UAV is assigned with a particular task which determines the
UAV’s flight pattern during its operation. Some examples of
these tasks include package delivery, aerial photography, and
geophysical survey. It is assumed that the UAVs are randomly
distributed in the area of the network prior to the mission. It is
also assumed that among the UAVs which operate in a close
proximity of each other, only one UAV is under an attack in
a given time [10]. In proposed trust monitoring model, we
calculate the trust score of each UAV and compare it with
the trust scores of its neighbor UAVs. Since all the neighbor
UAVs experience similar environmental conditions, if a UAV
presents an out-of-range trust score it can be identified as
an under-attack UAV. This trust monitoring method can be
scaled up to a large network by dividing the UAVs to several
clusters, where the UAVs withing each cluster experience
similar environmental conditions.
After clustering the neighbor UAVs, the central unit (e.g.,
an audit unit or the ground station) regularly measure the
trust score of all the UAVs within a cluster to keep track of
their behavior in order to detect any abnormalities in a real-
time manner. After each mission, the trust score of the UAVs
is reset to zero. To calculate this trust score, we consider
three factors: the task success rate, the energy consumption
rate, and the deviation of the UAV’s flight trajectory from its
expected path. The reason behind choosing these three factors
is that most common attacks impact one or more of these
behavioral factors. For instance, when a UAV is under the
man-in-the-middle attack, it usually skips some assigned tasks
(i.e. present a low task success rate). When a UAV is under
the DDoS attack or the hijacking attack, it will present an
unusual energy consumption pattern, where it may consume
more energy (because the attacker forces the UAV to perform
unexpected tasks) or less energy (because the attacker prevents
the UAV from performing its task), or when the UAV is under
the GPS spoofing which the attacker wants to mislead the UAV
into another location (deviation from the predicted path). In
continue, we define the three factors of trust.
A. Task Success Rate
One of the main factors to evaluate the trustworthiness of
an agent is the task success rate. During a flight, each UAV
is assigned with a couple of tasks and they are expected
to complete all of these tasks. It means that in a normal
condition, the number of successfully completed tasks should
be higher than the number of failed tasks. Sometimes due to
environmental and technical issues, the UAVs are not able to
complete all of their tasks, but still, the number of failed tasks
is lower than the number of successful tasks. However, when
the agents are under certain attacks such as the man-in-the-
middle attack, or the forwarding attack, they may deliver a
less number of successful tasks.
To evaluate the behavior of UAVs in terms of performing
their assigned tasks, we consider the history of completed
tasks for the UAVs during each mission. The trust factor is
expected to differentiate whether the underlying reason for not
completing the assigned tasks is related to an attack or because
the UAV is experiencing any environmental or technical issues.
Therefore, the trust factor considers the relative performance
of the UAVs rather than an individual performance. In this
case, if the UAVs are operating under bad weather conditions,
they all will underperform and deliver a low task success rate.
However, if one of the UAVs is under an attack, only this
UAV will experience a low task completion rate. Moreover,
since the task success rate is measured upon the completion
of a mission, it gives the UAVs the time to recover from the
potential technical issues they may face. For example, if the
UAV has a low battery level, it has the opportunity to put
a hold on performing the tasks to land on a recharging spot
and then complete the rest of the assigned tasks. Hence, when
looking at the record of this UAV during the entire mission,
the number of successful tasks is higher than the failed tasks.
The history of completed tasks can be considered either
based on the direct reports of the UAVs which is prone to
receiving false reports from the under-attack UAVs or it can
be estimated based on the direct or indirect observation of the
central unit. For instance, if the UAV’s task was to survey a
specific area, the central unit can determine if the task has been
successfully completed based on whether obtaining the image
of the entire region or not rather than relying on the UAV’s
self-report. Indeed, the central unit cannot always have such
a direct observation for all the assigned tasks. For instance,
if the UAV’s task was to drop a fire ball to ignite fire in a
particular area (a mechanism used to initiate controlled fires
to prevent wildfires [19] ), then the central unit may not be
able to accurately determine if the ball was dropped. However,
it can estimate if the task was performed by the UAV by
observing its impact on the field (i.e. fire in the target area)
with some level of uncertainty. To account for such potential
uncertainty in the assessment of the central unit in terms of
the number of successful or failed tasks for each UAV, we
propose a trust factor based on subjective logic framework
(SLF) [20]. Let us assume that s is the number of successful
tasks, f is the number of unsuccessful tasks, and x denotes the
number of tasks that the central unit can not certainly declare
as successful or unsuccessful. Based on this theory, the trust
is composed of a vector T = {b, d, u}. The parameters b, d, u
respectively represent the probability of trust, the probability
of distrust, and the chance of uncertainty, where they satisfy
b + d + u = 1 and b, d, u ∈ [0, 1]. The aforementioned
parameters are calculated as follows:
b =
s
s+ f + x
, d =
f
s+ f + x
, u =
x
s+ f + x
(1)
The calculation of the task success rate for binary state-
ments, which in our case, it is reliable and unreliable UAVs
is as below [20]:
Ttask =
2b+ u
2
(2)
B. Energy Consumption
Another important factor to asses the level of trust for
an agent is to calculate its energy consumption noting the
expected amount of energy for its assigned task. In a normal
condition, the energy consumption rate for each task should
be within a certain range. However, when the UAVs are under
an attack (e.g., the flooding and GPS spoofing), the energy
consumption rate would be higher or lower than the normal
range. Further, in bad weather conditions (e.g., strong winds),
the UAVs need to consume more energy to complete their
assigned tasks. In order to distinguish between the malicious
conditions and environmental conditions, we compare the
energy consumption of the UAVs in one cluster. For example,
if the energy consumption of one UAV is higher than the other
neighbor UAVs, it means that the UAV is under a flooding or a
GPS spoofing attack. Also, a low or high energy consumption
of a single UAV can be an indicator that the control of the UAV
has been taken over by an adversary. However, under unstable
environmental condition like heavy wind, all the neighbor
UAVs in a cluster present an unusual energy consumption as
they all experience similar a weather condition. Noting the
assumption that the attackers can target one UAV at a time in
one cluster [10], this proposed approach can reduce the rate
of false alarms in reporting the UAVs as malicious in extreme
environments.
As we mentioned before, each UAV in the same cluster
has the same initial energy, and since all UAVs are assigned
with similar types of tasks, they are expected to have a similar
energy consumption. In order to evaluate the behavior of the
UAVs within a cluster in terms of their energy consumption,
we need to compare the energy consumption of each UAV
(let us say UAV i) with the average consumption of all other
UAVs in that cluster based on (3). Let K denote the number of
UAVs in one cluster, and Ei denote the consumption energy
of the UAV i. The energy trust factor of UAV i, Tenei can
be calculated based on the absolute value of the difference
between Ei and Eavei as shown in (4).
Eavg−i =
1
K − 1
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Ej , (3)
Tenei =
|Ei − Eavg−i |
Eavg−i
(4)
C. Path Deviation
Each UAV in a cluster is assigned with several similar tasks
during their mission, and a particular path is expected for each
task before the mission is started. We assume that the UAVs
should follow the expected path; however, due to the different
reasons, the actual trajectory of the UAVs may be different
from their expected paths. One reason can be an extreme
weather condition (e.g., strong wind) to cause deviation from
the predicted path. Also, an obstacle in the UAV’s expected
path can cause a deviation from the original path for a short
time. Another reason for such deviation from the expected path
can be different cyber-physical attacks such as GPS spoofing.
In order to find out the main reason behind the UAV’s
path deviation, the audit unit observes the current location of
the UAVs based on the GPS information, and also it has an
estimation of the existing obstacles in the predefined region.
In order to calculate the deviation trust, the audit unit looks
at the history of the actual locations for α consecutive time
slots. At each time slot, the audit unit calculates the difference
between the actual and expected location; then, it calculates the
average of the differences for the α time slots. We can define
α based on the size of predefined obstacles. (5) expresses the
trust deviation at each time slot:
Tdev = (5)
t∑
i=t−α
√
(xexi − xaci)2 + (yexi − yaci)2 + (zexi − zaci)2
α
,
where xex, yex, zex is the expected location of the UAV and
xac, yac, zac is the actual location at time i.
If the deviation from the expected path is related to facing
an object or temporal harsh weather conditions, the UAV is
expected to return to the original path withing a short portion
of time; however, if the UAV has been attacked this deviation
will be observed for a long period of time. In this case, the
value of deviation trust is increased, which impacts the total
trust score. Since, the trust scores are compared with one
another, if the UAVs face extreme weather condition, they will
all have a considerable long-term deviation from their original
paths and this condition can be differentiated from potential
attacks.
Environmental issues may consume more energy than nor-
mal condition and cause deviation from the expected path. As
we discussed before, we compare the energy consumption of
the UAV with the neighbor UAVs, which they are in the same
cluster. In this case, by considering the amount of both energy
consumption and the deviation, we can recognize which one
is attack deviation and which one is a weather deviation.
D. Calculation of Trust score
The overall trust score of a UAV is defined by integrating
the task success rate trust, the energy trust, and the deviation
trust as follows:
Ttotal = wtask × Ttask + wene × Tene − wdev × Tdev, (6)
where wtask, wene, and wdev are weights, where wtask +
wene+wdev = 1, wtask, wene, wdev ∈ [0, 1]. We first calculate
the task success rate trust, energy trust and deviation trust, then
obtain the overall trust score of an agent using (6). Since the
deviation from the actual path decreases the total trust score,
we subtract the deviation from the total trust score. Then, the
trust score of each UAV in one cluster is compared with the
trust score of its neighbor UAVs to see whether the trust scores
are in the same range or not. For example, we have three UAVs
as it is shown in Algorithm 1. In the normal condition, the trust
score of three UAVs should be in the same range. If the range
of trust score of UAV1 is different from the other UAVs, it
means the UAV1 is under an attack.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
trust monitoring model in detecting the malicious UAVs us-
ing extensive simulations. We consider different Monte-Carlo
scenarios, where each scenario runs 1000 times for different
types of tasks, and the average is calculated as a result. In each
scenario, we assume we have three UAVs in one cluster, which
means they have the same initial energy, similar type of task,
and all of them are in the same environmental condition. Only
one UAV in a cluster can be under an attack. In each scenario,
we study one attack, which impacts at least one factor of the
trust model.
In this model, we monitor the trust score of the UAVs by
calculating the task success rate trust, the energy trust, and the
deviation trust at the ground station in a periodic way (e.g. we
consider four-minute intervals). After calculating these three
factors, we calculate the total trust score for each UAV and
compare them to see whether they are in the same range or
not. Based on the assumption that in each flight, just one of
the UAVs can be under the attack, if the range of one UAVs
trust score is different from the others, that UAV is reported
malicious.
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Fig. 1: UAVs’ behavior under a normal condition.
There are three different factors of energy consumption,
deviation the UAVs from their expected path, and the number
of tasks that impact the trust score of each UAV. Figure 1
shows the performance of the UAVs in a normal condition
where all of the trust scores are in the same range (Fig. 1a), and
all the UAVs have a low-level of deviation from their predicted
paths (Fig. 1b). Then, we consider different attack scenarios
to study whether our trust model can detect the attacks if at
least one of the factors is impacted. In these scenarios, we
assumed that UAV1 is a malicious UAV that can be impacted
by various attacks.
First, we consider a scenario where UAV1 is under the
DDoS attack. In this case, the energy consumption of UAV1
is higher than the other UAVs operating in the same cluster.
As shown in Fig. 2a, the range of trust score for UAV1 is
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UAV
1
UAV
2
UAV
3
UAV
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Tr
us
t 
Sc
or
es
Strong Wind
UAV1
UAV2
UAV3
(e) Trust score of all UAVs when experi-
encing a strong wind.
UAV
1
UAV
2
UAV
3
UAV
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Tr
us
t 
Sc
or
es
Selfish UAV
UAV1
UAV2
UAV3
(f) Trust scores of UAVs when UAV1 acts
selfishly or being hijacked.
Fig. 2: Trust scores and different scenarios for UAV1
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Fig. 3: Wind and GPS Spoofing for flight patterns.
higher than other UAVs, since it has larger value of energy
consumption.
In the second scenario, we study the case where UAV1
is under the GPS spoofing attack. Under such attack, the
UAV consumes more energy compared to the average energy
consumption rate, and it will not follow its expected path as
shown in Fig. 2d. Noting (6), the value of the deviation trust
is a large number, hence the trust score is a negative number
as shown in Fig. 2b.
The third scenario is the man-in-the-middle attack, in which
the number of failed tasks for the UAV1 is higher than the
number of successful tasks. In Fig. 2c, the number of failed
tasks is higher than the number of successful tasks for UAV1.
Based on (2), the task trust is decreased, thus the trust score
of UAV1 is less than the other UAVs.
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Fig. 4: Trsut score of all UAVs in bad weather with GPS
spoofing
The fourth scenario refers to the case that UAV1 has not
delivered its assigned tasks. This behavior can be an indicator
that the UAV has been hijacked or show that the UAV is acting
selfishly and does not follow the controller orders. This attack
can translate to investing less energy in the assigned tasks
compared to the average energy consumed by other UAVs.
In Fig. 2f, the UAV1 is selfish, hence the values of the task
success rate and the energy consumption are small numbers,
and consequently the trust score of this UAV is less than the
other UAVs.
In the last scenario, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed trust management mechanism in terms of understanding
Algorithm 1: Trust model pseudo code for all UAVs
for all UAVs do
Calculate the task trust score based on (2)
Calculate the energy trust score based on (4)
Calculate the deviation trust score based on (5)
And calculate the total trust score (Ti) based on (6)
end
for all UAVs do
if The range of the Tis is different from other UAVs
then
UAVi is not reliable
else
No attack happened for UAVi
end
end
the difference between the UAVs’ abnormal behavior when
they are under an attack or when they are operating under
harsh environmental conditions. First we test this scenario with
the strong wind. In the strong wind scenario, all the UAVs
consume more energy and show deviation from their predicted
paths, therefore all of the trust scores are in the same range. We
run this scenario 1000 times for different types of tasks and the
average results show that our model can correctly identify the
strong wind with 70% accuracy, as depicted in Fig. 2e. Then,
we test this scenario again by assuming that all the UAVs
experience the strong wind while UAV i is also under the
GPS spoofing attack. As we can see in Fig 3, all of the UAVs
have deviation from their expected path, however UAV1 has
more deviation due to the GPS spoofing attack. Based on (6)
the trust score of the UAV under the attack is bigger than the
rest of UAVs (shown in (4)). Therefore, the proposed model
can distinguish between the deviation of expected path due to
the strong wind and the GPS spoofing attack.
The UAV node gets a signal from each DS. By subtracting
the time the signal was transmitted from the time it was
received, each DS can calculate how far it is from the UAV
node. So given the travel time of the signals from the DS and
the exact position of DSs, the position of the UAV node can
be determined in three dimensions - east, north and altitude.
As it it shown in equation 7, ti is the time that the UAV node
received the signal, si is the time the signal was transmitted
by the DSi, and xi, yi, zi shows the exact location of DSi. β
is the receiver’s clock bias from the much more accurate DS’s
clock.
d(i,j) = (ti − β − si) ∗ c (7)
d(i,j) =
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + (z − zi)2, (8)
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of real-time detection of cyber-physical attacks
in a network of drones is studied. We developed an online
trust monitoring mechanism in which a central unit regularly
observes the operations of the UAVs in terms of their flight
trajectory, their energy consumption as well as performing
their assigned tasks and compare their trust factors to identify
any potential abnormal behaviors. The proposed comparative
approach enables the audit unit to differentiate between the
abnormal behaviors due to the cyber-physical attacks or the
potential unusual actions (e.g. turbulence or irregular energy
consumption) due to facing harsh environmental conditions.
Further, rather than relying on the self-report of the UAVs to
declare the number of their completed tasks or their future
path, the proposed trust monitoring approach estimates the
performance of the UAVs based on the observation of the
audit unit while accounting for the potential uncertainty in
such observations.
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